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Abstract: This paper describes a model for raising awareness of the real (irrational and subjective) behaviours
of the population in crisis situations. We analyse residents’ statements andpolice hearings gathered aer Victo-
ria Black Saturday bushfires in 2009 to deduce a model of human behaviour based on the distinction between
objective (capabilities, danger) and subjective (confidence, risk aversion) attributes, and on individual moti-
vations. We evaluate it against observed behaviour archetypes and statistics, and show its explicative value.
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Introduction
1.1 Natural disasters (earthquakes, tsunamis, snow storms, bushfires, floods, etc) cause many victims every year.
It is particularly important, in order to decrease the number of victims, to prepare the population and the
decision-makers in advance so that they can react appropriately when a crisis occurs. In this paper we are
interested in the bushfires in the state of Victoria in Australia. The state policy is ”Prepare, stay and defend,
or leave early”, so the population is given a choice between: evacuating early, before fire reaches their area of
residence, because "many people have died trying to leave at the last minute" (Country Fire Authority 2014);
or stay and defend their house, only if very well physically and mentally prepared. In both cases, the decision
must be made and a plan prepared well in advance. But in the summer 2009, serious bushfires devastated a
part of Victoria, culminating on the Black Saturday 7th February when 173 people died, despite all eorts at
raising awareness. Several reports (Teague et al. 2009a; McLennan & Elliott 2011) have tried to explain the rea-
sons for this heavy death toll and have identified inconsistencies in behaviour (the population does not react
as expected by decision-makers), in information (received information is not always considered as relevant by
the population), and in communication means (ineicient, specifically information broadcast).
1.2 We focus on the discrepancy between the population behaviour as expected by the decision-makers (that de-
termines what information is sent) and their actual behaviour (that determines what information they would
need or find relevant). We propose to explain this mismatch by a gap between objective and subjective values
of two aspects: risk, and ability to control it. Decision makers tend to predict behaviour based on objective
values, while each resident behaves based on their own, necessarily biased, subjective values.
1.3 Our approach is agent-basedmodelling and simulation (ABMS), where autonomous entities (agents) represent
thehumanresidents. ABMS is theclassical approachwhen focusingon individualbehaviours, orheterogeneous
capabilities and motivations among the population. But the originality of our approach is to have identified
themain behavioural patterns from actual survivors’ testimonies (Teague et al. 2009a). This is a very important
point because we want to simulate actual behaviours as opposed to expected, best or prescribed behaviours.
1.4 The paper is structured as follows: we first describe our analysis of witness statements (Section 2), and how
we used those to design our conceptual model of population behaviour, that we show to be consistent with
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psychology (Section 3). We then describe the implementation of our model on the GAMA simulation platform
(Section 4) and its evaluation against behaviour data (Section 5). We conclude (Section 6) with a discussion of
these results, comparison with related works, and future directions of research.
Analysis of Behaviour Data
Methodology
2.1 There are 2 main diiculties in building a realistic agent-based model of human behaviour: finding the right
balance between model descriptivity (realistic enough to accurately describe and generate believable human
behaviour for each agent) and complexity (yet simple enough for its results to be easily understandable) (Ed-
monds & Moss 2005; Adam & Gaudou 2016); and finding and exploiting data to inform the model.
2.2 To solve theproblemof data, we chose the2009Victorianbushfires as a case studybecauseof thehugeamount
of availabledataabout thepopulationbehaviours: 100witness statements (Teagueet al. 2009b), 86policehear-
ings about circumstances of deaths (Teague et al. 2009d), and extensive statistics about the fatalities (Teague
et al. 2009c). As a compromise between descriptivity and complexity, we chose to model the agents with a
finite state architecture (their behaviour depends onwhich state they are currently in, and transitions between
states depend on their attributes). This appears to fit well with the testimonies that we analysed to design our
model.
2.3 In the absence of appropriate tools and methodologies to handle such unformatted data, we manually anal-
ysed the interviews to extract relevant information of several types. First, we listed the domain actions and
behavioural states mentioned by the interviewees, to design the finite state machine. Second, we focused on
extracting factors that could explain seemingly irrational behaviour, and short-listed those that appearedmost
frequently. Third, we hypothesised empirical behaviour rules to explain the precise impact of those factors,
bymatching themwith known theories from the psychological literature. For space reasons, belowwe only list
someextracts thatbest illustrate eachpossible explanation found, anddiscuss inmoredetails howweexploited
them to design and inform our model.
Witness statements and statistics
2.4 We started from interviews gathered by the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission (VBRC) aer the Black
Saturday bushfires, among 100 residents of the bushfire aected areas (Teague et al. 2009b). We discuss in this
section some particularly relevant extracts that illustrate various types of discrepancy between expected and
observed behaviour: under-estimation of danger, passivity, denial, over-estimation of capabilities, etc. All the
quotes below are taken from this report (Teague et al. 2009b).
Under-estimation of danger
2.5 Reports state that "among those who died, some misinterpreted the information they had received, not re-
alising how little time they had to respond or how soon the fire would reach them". As a result they did not
have enough time to implement their fire plans. Even people who did not plan to defend still found themselves
forced to when surprised by the fire. For instance, this father reports how he evaluated danger while preparing
his property with his son, intending and expecting to leave safely well before the fire reached it.
”When we headed up to [the] property, there was just a little fire at the bottom of the hills and I didn’t
think there were any major dramas. [...] We could see the smoke coming up over that ridge. I wasn’t
tooworried at that stage as the smokewas still two valleys away. [...] Wewatched the fire come up to
the communications tower. We could see that theywere fighting the fire really hard up there to stop it
getting to the tower. We could see helicopters and bulldozers. [...] When I saw them knock the fire o
the top of the hill I was quietly confident that we were going to be okay then. [...] As soon as I saw the
smoke I decided it would be too dangerous to drive the 5km bush track out. I then prepared to face
the fire.”
Another reason for a wrong evaluation of danger comes from sudden and unexpected wind changes, a "major
cause of the deaths that resulted from the 7 February bushfires".
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Over-estimation of capabilities
2.6 Many residents had over-estimated their ability to face the fires, and were unaware and unprepared.
”Although I had never really given itmuch consideration, I suppose thatmy fire plan always consisted
of staying and defending my property. [...] Nothing prepared me for this bushfire. Although I never
thought about leaving, I now know that my decision to stay and defend was not a well-thought-out
decision and that I was very underprepared. In particular, I was psychologically unprepared to fight
a bushfire. I simply did not have any idea what the reality of facing a fire would be. [...] Most people,
including myself, just did not understand what it would really be like, facing a fire coming straight at
you.”
Some were well-prepared physically but ignored the psychological preparation also needed to face such a
strong fire.
”Despite saving our lives and our house, I don’t think I would ever stay and defend again. We were
physically very well prepared [...] but I don’t think anything can prepare you for the psychological
impact of facing the inferno that hit us on Black Saturday.”
Others did not update their perceived ability with their current condition (age, illness), like this woman report-
ing how her husband insisted on defending their house despite now being old and unable to do so anymore.
”[He]was inMarysville during the 1939 bushfires and fought the fire from the roof of our old house and
helped to successfully save that house. [He] also spent many years working for the Forestry Commis-
sion and one of his jobs there was to go to dierent places to fight fires. During his younger years, [he]
was a very fit and strongman. [...] During the last few years of his life, [his] health deteriorated, [...] he
had a degenerative spinal disease which aected his mobility. [He] was a proudman and [...] having
been such a good sportsman, he found his loss of mobility very diicult to accept.”
Reports confirm that "most of those who died did not, and oen could not, respond appropriately to the risk
that the bushfires presented for them on 7 February"; in particular 30% of fatalities occurred in undefendable
properties.
Passivity
2.7 Many people stayed passive in front of fire until it was too late, therefore feeling as if everything went too fast.
It was reported (Teague et al. 2009c) that 69% of the fatalities were "passively sheltering" when they died.
2.8 For instance this woman reports how she was fascinated by the fire and could not stop watching it.
”This was not a conscious decision, but I was standing just outside the housewatching for flames and
when they came, they came so suddenly that I just didn’t have time to do anything or than stand and
watch. It feels almost sacrilegious to say this, but I found the fire fascinating and strangely beautiful.
The contrast of the black and red was stunning.”
Individual dierences
2.9 Dierent individuals can have dierent perceptions of risk andmotivations, resulting in various emotions, and
a negotiation of the decision. On average, men prefer to defend their house, while women want to leave but
oen end up staying with their partners because they are reluctant to leave them behind (Teague et al. 2009c).
Witness statements illustrate the impact of relationships, and the resulting negotiation and emotions.
2.10 For instance, all four members of a family died in their house because they could not agree on leaving.
”Shewas determined to leave, but [her husband] wouldn’t leave his parents. [His father] wouldn’t go,
[his mother] wouldn’t leave [his father], [her husband] wouldn’t leave his parents.”
In another statement, the wife ended up escaping alone to safety because she could not convince her husband
to leave (he died in their house).
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”I continued to talk to [my husband] and tried several times to persuade him to leave, but he would
not budge. I could smell the fire, I could hear the fire and I could see it withmy own eyes. But I couldn’t
get my husband to accept that it was coming. He just sat and sat and sat. [...] I decided that I could
not stand it any longer. I was feeling very anxious and angry with [my husband]. I kept saying "hurry
up, come onwe’ve got to go". The fire seemed to be coming closer. I could hear the fire crackling. Aer
toomuch of that I thought "I’m not staying here to burn". So I walked out the gate and I le the house
on foot. [...] When I le the house, I had no idea where I was going âĂŞ the only thing I can remember
is that I wanted to get out. I was not thinking clearly because I was so annoyed with [him] and I was
also feeling terribly guilty about leaving him. I still have this guilty feeling because I survived and he
didn’t. Should I have stayed and if I had, what could I have done?”
This last statement also illustrates the well-known survivor’s guilt, which we do not address yet.
External motivations to defend
2.11 People can have additional motivation to defend their house, for instance for financial or emotional reasons.
Some residents report having stored expensive equipment or personal belongings.
”I also had many belongings stored on [the] property in four sheds. I am a hoarder by nature [...]. My
belongings included the fit out of a cafe that I used to own, $50,000 - $60,000worth of tools [...]. I also
stored family photos and personal papers in the sheds.”
Others report drawing additional income from cattle or plantations.
”[We] are both retired teachers. The olive grove had been planted in 1999 and the trees were at full
production. Both the cattle and the olive grove provided additional income for our retirement.”
In both cases they tried to protect their belongings from the fire.
Summary
2.12 In conclusion, the manual analysis of these statements highlighted the essential role of some human factors
in decision making, that should therefore be included in our model. These factors are: a discrepancy between
actual danger and perception of risks; a discrepancy between actual abilities and confidence in one’s abilities;
inter-individual dierences in initial motivations for defense (e.g. financial) or escape (e.g. risk aversion); inter-
individual dierences in awareness of and knowledge about fires. It also showed that residents go through
dierent stages based on these factors (unaware, passive, preparing, defending, escaping...); they can stay in
eachstage for a varyingamountof time,withmany residents surprisedby the firewhile still indecisiveorpassive
(58% of fatalities hadmade no preparation at all, neither for leaving nor for staying); and they can die in any of
those stages.
Conceptual Model of Population Behaviour
Behaviour model: finite state machine
3.1 The manual analysis of these interviews clearly showed that the residents base their decisions on subjective
(and possibly biased) representations of their environment and of themselves: a subjective perception of risk
(that can be wrong, biased, under-estimated), and a subjective estimation of their abilities to deal with it or
escape it (that can be wrong, biased, over-estimated). Residents can also be too attached to a predefined plan.
All these factors lead to amore risky behaviour than the rational one as expected by the authorities, that would
be based on an objective perception of risk and self abilities.
3.2 In order tohighlight the role of these subjective, irrational determinants of thedecisions andbehaviours of each
resident, we need amodel descriptive enough to capture these factors, but not so complex that the results will
not be understandable. Our choice is to model the population as heterogeneous agents, each having their
own values of attributes to trigger possibly dierent behaviours in a similar situation. We chose a finite-state-
machinearchitecture to capture thedierent stagesobserved in the interviews (unawareof the fires, indecisive,
preparing, etc) and the transitions between them.
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Residents attributes and actions
3.3 In order to provide a conceptual model, we had tomake some simplifications and abstract a limited number of
relevant attributes and actions to be represented.
3.4 Residents are representedbyagentswith their own individual attributes, as identified fromthe interviews. They
have in particular: physical attributes (health, injuries, objective danger, objective abilities), and cognitive at-
tributes (subjective evaluation of their capabilities and of danger, motivations).
3.5 Agents can perform various actions as stated by the interviewees: observe the fires, prepare their house and
themselves in various ways, fight the fire, escape their house towards a safe shelter. Their choice of action
depends on their perceived and appraised (a.k.a. subjective) danger and abilities, and on their motivation.
For instance a resident who is motivated to defend their house, and believes they are capable of doing so, will
probably choose to stay and defend. However, their success when performing actions depends on their actual
ability (a.k.a. objective ability) and on the actual danger (a.k.a objective danger). For instance, a resident who
believes he is capable of defendingmight be over-estimating his ability, and the success or failure of his defense
depends on his actual ability rather than on his estimation of it.
States and transitions of the FSM
3.6 A finite-state machine (FSM) architecture describes the behaviour of an agent in terms of dierent possible
states; the agent starts in the initial state, and has one single current state at each time. Each state is associated
with: the actions performed by the agent while in this state; and the transition conditions to move towards
other states.
3.7 The architecture of the residents agents in our model is a finite-state machine (cf Figure 1). Its states and tran-
sitions are inspired by the stages observed in the interviews, and are as follows:
• Unaware: initially the agent is (rightly or wrongly) unaware of any danger, and does nothing; agents
can become aware (transition to Aware Indecisive) by spotting fires around them (see flames, smell
smoke...);
• Aware Indecisive: the agent is aware of some fires but has not yet made a decision about how to re-
act; agents stay indecisive for a varying amount of time, before choosing to either defend their house
(transition to Preparing to defend) or escape (transition to Preparing to escape);
• Preparing to escape: theagenthasdecided to leaveandstartspreparing, until either ready (transition
to Escaping), or surprised by the fire and forced to escape before being ready (transition to Escaping as
well), or blocked by the fire and forced to stay (transition to Preparing to defend);
• Escaping: the agent is evacuating towards the closest shelter; travel eiciency depends on objective
abilities; injuries can be received from fires on theway. Unless it dies during travel due to fire burns (tran-
sition to Dead), its next state will be Safewhen reaching the shelter;
• Preparing to defend: the agent has either decided to defend, or was forced to stay because the fire
blocks escape; it prepares its house and itself until the fire is close enough to be fought, which triggers
the transition to Defending;
• Defending: the agent is actively fighting the fire around its house; when that fire is extinguished, the
agent transitions back to Preparing to defend until another fire comes; if fighting the fire makes it
reevaluate the danger or its own capabilities and that evacuation becomes more urgent, the agent tran-
sitions directly to Escaping;
• Safe: the agent is (and will stay) in a shelter, it cannot leave it, and cannot be injured anymore.
3.8 Twomore states are particular as they can be reached from all the other states:
• Dead: final state of agents which have been killed by the fire (fromwhatever other state);
• Survivor: final stateofall agents thatdidnotdieduring the fires (e.g. successfuldefenders, luckypassive,
and all sheltered residents), reached at the end of the simulation.
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Figure 1: Residents behaviour: states and transitions. Dead and Survivor states can be reached fromany other
state. The flip function represents probabilistic transitions.
Evaluation of the conceptual model
3.9 This simple conceptual model is suicient to capture the discrepancies highlighted by the data. Indeed the
objective value of danger influences injuries and damage, and the objective value of capability influences the
success of actions. But these objective values are inaccessible to the agents, whose decisions are based on
their subjective values of danger and abilities, and on their motivations. This therefore explains the observed
dierence between expected rational behaviour (based on objective danger and ability) and actual behaviour
(based on subjective danger and ability). Before implementing our conceptual model, we evaluate in the next
paragraph its consistency with psychological theories of human behaviour.
Comparison with the psychology of stress
3.10 Our model is in agreement with Lazarus’ theory of stress (Lazarus 1991; Lazarus & Folkman 1984), making a
distinction between two simultaneous processes:
• Primary (or demands) appraisal consists in evaluating the significance of the situation for the individ-
ual (good, stressing, or irrelevant); this demands appraisal matches our subjective danger, which is an
evaluation of the dangerousness of the situation;
• Secondary (or resources) appraisal consists in evaluating the individual’s capability (skills, social and
material support, resources) to cope with the stressor; this resources appraisal matches our subjective
ability, which is an evaluation of the ability to deal with the fire.
Comparison with cognitive bias theories
3.11 Behaviours reported in the statements are consistent with known cognitive bias (Yudkowsky 2008; Kinateder
et al. 2014), in particular the confirmation bias, a tendency to give more credit to information consistent with
one’s beliefs or motivation, and to discard inconsistent cues (e.g. interpreting the presence of firemen as a sign
that everything is safe, or denying the reality of the fire when wanting to stay). In other words, motivation
tends to bias interpretation: people focusmore on cues that support their currentmotivation, and less on cues
that would contradict it, the extreme case being denial as illustrated above. Our model allows to capture this
confirmation bias, because the motivation attributes play a role in the computation of subjective danger and
subjective ability.
3.12 Many other biases were also found in the interviews, which shows that modelling them is particularly relevant
for simulating human behaviour in crisis situations. For instance:
• the anchoring eect: an excessive focus on the first information received, preventing residents from
changing their mind aer making an initial decision;
• the hindsight bias, making people believe aerwards that they could have predicted the events (and that
they will next time), andmaking them feel guilty for not having predicted them;
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• the bandwagon eect: doing and believing the same as others around;
• the planning fallacy: underestimating the time something will take, for instance preparing;
• the sunk cost fallacy: refusing to abandon an action because of having already invested in it (making the
goal less likely to change as more actions have been performed to reach it).
Capturing all these biases would require a more complex model, that we will develop in future work. In partic-
ular, our current model does not yet take into account interpersonal relationships (needed to copy beliefs and
actions of others), planning and committing to actions, following norms, or triggering emotions.
Implemented Model of Behaviour in Bushfires
4.1 We implemented our conceptualmodel1 in version 1.6.1 of the GAMA simulation platform (Grignard. et al. 2013).
Model of environment
4.2 For the sake of simplicity, the environment is a grid containing the dierent types of agents (houses, shel-
ters, fires, and residents). This simplistic environment is not realistic but is suicient to simulate the residents’
decision-making in reaction to fires.
Fire
4.3 Very complex and detailedmodels of fire spreading already exist (Du et al. 2013), but realistic fire behaviour is
not the focus here. Still with the goal of not adding unneeded complexity, we have designed a very simplistic
model of fire that is suicient to trigger and visualise the reactions of the population that we are interested in
here. The fire is composed of fire agents (eachwith a location and an intensity representing its radius of action),
having a reflex architecture, i.e. the following reflexes are triggered at each step of the simulation:
• Increase or decrease intensity: probabilities are parameters.
• Propagate to a non-burning neighbour cell, creating a new fire agent. Probability of propagating, and
starting intensity of new fires, are parameters.
• Deal damage to buildings in its radius of action (based on its intensity): the amount of damage is picked
randomly between 0 and amaximum value, function of intensity and a ”damage factor” parameter.
• Deal injuries to residents in its radius of action, also randomamount between 0 and themaximum value
based on its intensity and an ”injury factor” parameter. If the person is in their house, the injury is mod-
erated by its resistance weighed by a ”protection factor” parameter.
• Disappearwhen its intensity is null.
Houses
4.4 The environment initially contains a number (parameter) of houses each inhabited by exactly 1 resident (in
future work we plan to consider families and their relationships). Each house is an agent with the following
attributes:
• Owner: the resident of that house
• Resistance: random initial value between 100 and 200 to simulate dierent solidity, will be increased by
preparing, or decreased by fire damage, and oers some protection from fire injuries to its resident.
• Damage: the damage received from fire
4.5 The houses collapse from fire damage when their resistance drops to 0. They then cease to oer protection,
and the resident’s motivation to defend them also disappears. They stay in the environment as ruins for final
visualisation.
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Shelters
4.6 Shelters are safe places whose location is known by all residents2. They oer a total protection from fires (no
injuries can be received while in a shelter). Once a resident has reached a shelter, he stays inside until the end
of the simulation.
Model of residents
Architecture
4.7 WeusedGAMA finite-state-machine (fsm) architecture for the residents, with the states specified in our concep-
tual model above: initial state Unaware; states during the fires: Aware Indecisive, Preparing to defend,
Defending, Preparing to escape, Escaping, Dead, Safe; final state Survivor, only reached by agents still
alive when all fires are stopped.
Attributes
4.8 The agents have various attributes that influence their behaviour depending on their value for each individual.
There are twomain types of attributes: physical and cognitive.
4.9 Physical attributes include:
• Current state (initially Unaware, then following the fsm, see Figure 1).
• House id (each agent is initially in a house, and there is only one agent per house)
• Health: random initial value (between 100 and 200), increased by preparing for fire, decreased when
receiving injuries. Agents whose health drops to 0 die3
• Injuries: total injuries received from fires, decrease health level and influence decision to escape.
• Location on the grid. This attribute is used to compute and update the distance to the closest fire as the
situation evolves.
• Objective danger: dynamic float value (normalised between 0 and 1) computed as a function of the in-
tensity of and distance to the dierent fires present in the environment; its value is 0 in a shelter.
• Objective defense ability: random static value (float between 0 and 1) impacting the chance to perceive
fires in perception radius, and the eect of preparation and defense actions.
• Objective escape ability: random static value (e.g. driving vs walking, fitness), impacting accuracy and
speed of evacuation actions. The possibility to escape is evaluated by observing the environment and
checking if a safe path exists to a shelter.
Cognitive attributes include the human factors identified in the interviews above:
• Awareness: boolean indicating if the resident is aware (i.e. has perceived at least one fire). The resident
also maintains a list of known fires.
• Subjectivedanger (normalisedbetween0 and 1) is computed as a function of intensity of anddistance to
only the known fires. It is biased bymotivations (someonemotivated to escapewill tend to over-estimate
danger, while someonemotivated to stay will under-estimate it).
• Subjective ability (random float between 0 and 1) is updated during the simulation with the feedback
from the resident’s actions (time spent defending, eect on fires, number of fires extinguished): success
increases subjective ability while failure decreases it. It is also biased by motivation to defend (the more
one wants to defend, the more capable they feel).
• Subjective defense ability: initialised by applying a (under- or over-estimation) bias (based on confi-
dence parameter and defense motivation) on objective ability, then updated (rate is a parameter) by ob-
serving performance (success or failure of defense actions); influences defense motivation.
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• Motivation to escape: float value between 0 and 1 representing a summary of all motivations to (not) es-
cape (risk aversion, protecting children, laziness to leave if not needed, etc). It has a random initial value,
and is thenupdatedbasedon subjective danger, health, and resistance of the house (oering protection).
It influences the decision to escape.
• Motivation to defend: float value between 0 and 1 representing a summary of all dierent motivations
to defend (protect one’s livelihood, emotional attachment to house, etc). It has a random initial value
(e.g. financial reasons, previous experience), and is then dynamically updated based on subjective eval-
uation of danger and fighting capabilities (feedback from defense actions), health and injuries received,
and house status (themore capable and healthy, themoremotivated a resident will be). It influences the
decision to stay and defend.
The update of these values is implemented as reflexes, performed at the start of each cycle of the simulation.
Actions
4.10 Residents agents can perform the following actions depending on their state:
• Observe fires: action performed by all agents as a reflex at each cycle of the simulation. Their chance of
actually detectinga (new) firedependson their objective ability. Detected fires areadded to the resident’s
list of known fires, andmotivations are subsequently updated.
• Prepare for fire: action performed while in Preparing to defend or Preparing to escape state. It
consists in raising the resistance of the house (to simulate various actions such as watering, weeding,
etc) and the agent’s health (to simulate the eect of wearing appropriate clothing, etc). The value of the
increment is computed based on the agent’s objective ability and on a parameter of the resident agents.
Success or failure of this action in monitored by the agent and influences its subjective ability.
• Fight fire: action performed while in Defending state. Its eect is to decrease the intensity of nearby
fires by a value basedonobjective ability andonanother resident parameter. The agentmonitors success
(number of fires extinguish, total intensity decrement) to update its subjective ability, thus reconsidering
its motivation over time.
• Escape: action performedwhile in the Escaping state. Its eect is to compute and follow a path towards
the nearest shelter. The resident’s evacuation speed and accuracy depend on its objective escape ability:
an agent with a low ability has more chances to take a longer path (to simulate getting lost or not taking
the best route), and it moves more slowly along that path (e.g. disabled or injured people). Agents might
get injured while escaping if they travel too close to the fire.
User interactivity
4.11 With the eventual goal of turning this simulation into a serious game, we have already inserted some level of
user interactivity to help them observe the desired behaviours. Ourmodel allows two kinds of interaction with
the simulation: direct actions (thatmodify the stateof the simulationat runtime), andsetting simulationparam-
eters. Available actions implemented so far in ourmodel are limited to starting new fires (at random locations)
and stopping all fires (and thus the simulation).
4.12 There are two types of parameters: initialisation parameters (requiring a re-launch to be taken into account),
and runtime parameters (whose eects immediatelymodify the simulation behaviour). The parameters of our
simulation allow the user to: initialise the environment as desired (initial number of fires and buildings, etc),
make the fire more or less dangerous (growing and propagating quicker, dealing more damage and injuries,
etc), and set properties shared by all residents (probability to detect fires in perception radius, bias in updating
beliefs, etc).
Results and Evaluation of the Model
5.1 In this section we describe the experiments we ran to evaluate our model.
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Initialisation of the simulation
5.2 The environment is a 50x50 non-torus grid (cf Figure 2), initially containing 2 shelters in the NE and SW cor-
ners (blue-green circles) and 200 houses (grey squares) inhabited by 200 residents. Attributes are randomly
initialised (health and resistance between 100 and 200; capabilities and motivations between 0 and 1). The
simulation starts with 20 medium fires (orange triangles) that then grow and propagate. Burning cells are in
red, surrounded by yellow cells (radiant heat, radius equal to the fire intensity); green cells are safe. At run-
time4, the user of the simulation can start random new fires or stop all fires, and can specify 3 categories of
parameters concerning: fires (probability to grow or propagate, initial intensity, damage factor, etc); buildings
(resistance, protection factor, etc); and residents (confidence bias, perception and action radius, etc).
5.3 The residents have 2 colours to visualise their current (outside colour) and previous (centre colour) state in
the fsm: dark blue (unaware), pink (indecisive), orange (preparing to defend), red (defending), yellow
(preparing to escape), light blue (escaping, with an additional nuance of blue grey if escaping before they
are ready), dark green (safe), black (dead). There is no specific colour for the survivor state as it is reached
by all agents still alive when the fire stops.
Figure 2: Screenshot of the simulation in GAMA, with parameters and their values.
Evaluationmethodology
5.4 Our model is aimed at the reproduction of realistic human behaviours (and not at realistic initial situation or
fire spreading), and should therefore not be evaluated as a whole. This is why we focus here on evaluating
the generated human behaviour. We have implemented a tool to track and log the agents’ states trajectories:
what states they went through, at what cycle, and what were the values of their attributes when making the
transition. This allows us to study and explain what happens in the simulation. Thanks to this tool, we can
evaluate our model on two axis: correctness, by comparing the generated trajectories with those observed in
the real population (profiles of behaviours), and in particular comparing the causes of deaths; and explicative
value, by showing the importance of the subjective-objective discrepancy, thus proving the potential of our
model to raise decision-makers’ awareness of this gap.
Evaluation of the correctness of model
Consistency with behaviour profiles
5.5 A report (Rhodes 2014) has established 6 profiles of behaviours in the residents of fire-aected areas: can-do
defenders (most determined, experienced, self-confident and skilled, determined to defend); considered de-
fenders (strongly committed to defend, aware of risks, well prepared and trained); livelihooddefenders (com-
mitted to defend their livelihood, well prepared); threat monitors (not intending to stay in front of a serious
threat, nor to leave until necessary, wait and see); threat avoiders (aware of risks an dvulnerability, plan to
leave early before any real threat); unaware reactors (unaware of risk, feel unconcerned, no knowledge, prepa-
ration or training).
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5.6 Wewere able to observe the sameprofiles of behaviours in our simulation, and to categorise the agents in these
profiles based on their logged trajectories. For instance a typical trajectory for a can-dodefender is an early per-
ception of the fire (transition to Indecisive followed by an immediate decision (transition to Preparing to
defend), an eicient preparation (strong improvement of health and resistance in that state) and defense (big
decrease of fire intensity). Also they have a good perception of risks and are able to reconsider their intention
(transition toEscapingwhenhealthdecreases toomuch), unlike livelihooddefenderswho tend to stayon their
property no matter what happens. We have then computed average values of the attributes in each category
of agents and compared themwith the global value on all agents. For instance we found that can-do defenders
have a significantly higher self-confidence, which is in agreement with the definition of the profile.
Consistency with death causes statistics
5.7 The VBRC report also provides statistics about the circumstances of the 173 deaths drawn from police hearings
and experts reports. In particular they found that 14% died while fleeing (4% in cars, 10% on foot); 69% while
"passively sheltering" (as opposed to "actively defending"), possibly aer having tried to defend; some died
while defending, even when well prepared. In total 30% were taken by surprise by the fire. Figure 3 shows the
percentageofdeaths fromeach state inour simulation. Witha firstmanual calibrationofourparameters,weob-
tained the following distribution of causes of death: 47% of the agents died while still passive (indecisive); 19%
diewhile escaping; the others diedwhile preparing to defend (28%) or defending (6%), taken by surprise before
they could evacuate. Of course, dierentmodels can lay the same resultswithdierent underlyingmechanisms
(this is known as the equifinality problem). However, our conceptual model was designed from qualitative be-
haviour data and evaluated against psychological theories (see Section 3.8), which helps in ensuring that we
get the right distribution of death causes for the right reason, and not only as a result of calibration. In future
works we will do a sensitivity analysis to reduce the number of parameters, and do an automatic calibration of
our model.
Figure 3: Causes of death in our simulation.
5.8 Figure 4 compares the death causes in our simulation with those reported in the 2009 bushfires. The problem
is that the categories of death causes considered in the available statistics do not exactly match the states in
our simulation, apart from the escaping category (where the numbers are quite close). In particular, 60%of the
victims in the real populationdiedwhilepassively sheltering,whether theyhadmade somepreparationsor not.
In our simulationwe do not have a ”passive sheltering” state, so an agent that started actively preparing cannot
return to a passive state. As a result, we find less passive victims (47% vs 69%) but these are only the agents
that stayed passive all along. On the contrarywe havemore active victims becausewe included in this category
both the agents deadwhile preparing (28%) and thosedeadwhile defending (6%). The statistics about the 2009
bushfires onlymention ”some” victims dyingwhile defending (in Figure 4we extrapolated to show the 17%who
died neither while escaping nor while passively sheltering, as being the ones who died while defending). With
this dierence in categories inmind, the death causes in our simulation are pretty close to the real death causes
observed in the 2009 bushfires.
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Figure 4: Comparison between real and simulated rates of death causes.
Explicative value of our model
5.9 The goal of our model is to raise decision-makers’ awareness of the factors determining real population be-
haviour, as opposed to expected behaviour. Indeed, the statements clearly show that decision-makers expect
a "rational" behaviour based on objective values, while people behaved based on their subjective (possibly
wrong) values. Our hypothesis was that the discrepancy between these objective and subjective values of dan-
ger and capabilities could explain deaths, and should therefore be taken into account. If we are right, we should
observe stronger discrepancy in agents who die than in agents who survive.
5.10 Figure 5 shows the evolution over time of the average discrepancy between objective and subjective values of
danger and capabilities, for alive agents and for dead agents. Note that once dead, agents do not update their
values, so the evolution only comes from new agents dying over time.
• Danger discrepancy for dead agents (red) starts at 0 (no death yet) then jumps to a very high value as
the first agents die while unaware of (yet real) danger. It then tends to decrease as the agents dying later
in the simulation are those who have a lower underestimation of danger.
• Danger discrepancy for alive agents (orange) is always much lower than in dead agents; it also contin-
uously decreases for two reasons: agents with a higher discrepancy die, and those that survive update
their perception of danger to tend towards the objective value.
• Ability discrepancy for dead agents (blue) also starts (and stays) higher than for alive agents. It de-
creases quickly at the start (as agents with higher discrepancy died early), then stays mostly stable.
• Ability discrepancy in alive agents (green) keeps going down, until the last survivors tend to actually
underestimate their abilities (this is due to them updating their subjective abilities based on their perfor-
mance at fighting the fire, which gets worse as the fire keeps intensifying).
Discussion and Conclusion
6.1 In this paper we therefore provided a realistic model of population behaviour, based on qualitative data from
interviews, consistentwith statistics of causes of deaths, andwith a high explicative value. It is important to no-
tice that despite being designed to simulate the behaviour of the Australian population in bushfires, thismodel
is relatively generic and could be applied to other contexts. Some aspects are not generalisable because they
depend on the particular culture or type of disaster. For instance the norms at play dier depending on the
country (in Australia, people are given a choice to evacuate or stay and defend; in France they are requested to
shelter in their house; inother countries theyare required toevacuate). Theappropriatebehaviour ina fire (pos-
sibility to save your house from the flames) may not be appropriate in another type of disaster (defending your
house can be a valid choice in a hurricane or a flood, but not in a tsunami or earthquake). However, the main
aspects highlighted in this work, i.e. the role of cognitive factors in explaining seemingly irrational behaviour,
are generalisable to any type of crisis situation. In particular, cognitive biases and a subjective perception of
risk oen impact decisions in such time-pressured situations Kinateder et al. (2014).
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Figure 5: Average discrepancy between objective/subjective perception of danger and abilities in alive/dead
agents.
Comparison with related works
6.2 Some existing simulations focus on realistic fire behaviour and spreading (e.g.Phoenix (Du et al. 2013)), easier
tounderstand inphysical terms. On the contrary as far asweknownomodel provide the samedegreeof realism
for human behaviour. Indeed, many agent-based simulations focus on crowd evacuation in building fires, with
oen homogeneous reactive agents (e.g. social force model (Helbing & Molnar 1995)). More complex models
have then appeared, integrating emotions (Le et al. 2010; Nguyen et al. 2014) or social relationships (Chu et al.
2014) of agents, but they are usually based on psychological theories. An exception is the work of (Shendarkar
et al. 2008) who simulated evacuation under terrorist bombing attacks with BDI agents, and used participative
modelling to capture behaviours in a Virtual Reality laboratory. Our work also diers from this main trend as
we rely not on theories but on witness statements providing a precise description of people actual behaviour.
6.3 Existing simulations oen focus on the evacuation of public buildings (e.g. airport (Tsai et al. 2011), stadium,
or buildings (Rogsch et al. 2014; Ronchi & Nilsson 2013)) to inform their design and prevent typical problems
(e.g. crowding at doors or in stairs), which are not relevant in our case study of bushfires in wide and scarcely
populated outdoor areas.
6.4 Indeed we can make (in line with (Le 2016)) a distinction between indoor (e.g. stadium, airport, train station...)
and outdoor (e.g. beach in case of a Tsunami (Nurdin & Yuliana 2012; Nguyen et al. 2012)) evacuations. Both are
focused on simulating individuals trying to flee from a hazard. But the main specificity of indoor evacuations
is that the high density of people and some features of the environment (e.g. walls and exit doors size) con-
strain movement, induce severe congestion issues, decrease evacuation rate and tend to increase the number
of victims. As a result, these studies are generally interested in how to improve building layout.
6.5 On the contrary, outdoor evacuations are less influenced by environment constraints, as the space for people
to move is wider (outdoor evacuations are oen at the scale of a district or entire town) (Nguyen et al. 2012).
However, in theabsenceof signalshelpingpeople indoors to find theirway to theexits, themain issue forpeople
outdoors is to find a way to shelters (Le et al. 2015). Congestion can happen but in dierent forms: people tend
to evacuate thanks to transportation means such as cars (Dawson et al. 2011; Mas et al. 2012), leading to traic
jams. Our study is thus closer to (Le et al. 2015) work, as we consider a scarcely populated environment which
avoids cases of congestion.
6.6 Another dierence is that due to this dierent scale, outdoor evacuation simulations focus less on complex
individual behaviour and more on crowd behaviour (Beck et al. 2014). For instance (Le et al. 2015) attempt to
optimize the location of evacuation signs to evacuate a beach during a tsunami. On the contrary, many indoor
simulations try to better understand the cognitive factors influencing people evacuation. The most studied
factors are emotions (Minh et al. 2010; Johnson 1987) and social bonds (Ta et al. 2015; Chu et al. 2015, 2014).
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However,we focuson the cognitive factors influencingpeople evacuation fromtheir home: subjective appraisal
of danger and abilities, motivations, cognitive bias... In future work we plan to also add emotions, which are
very important in such situations, as shown by the interviews (home attachment, fear, survivor’s guilt, etc).
6.7 Besides, most of these simulations tend to focus on the evacuation itself, neglecting the pre-evacuation time
which is at least as important (Kinateder et al. 2014). On the contrarywe didmodel this decision-making phase,
which is evenmore important in bushfires where people are not evacuating from a public building (where their
only motivation is to save their life) but have to abandon their own house to the flames (with an additional
contradictory motivation to also save it).
6.8 Sowedier from the state of the art byproviding a simulationof thepopulationbehaviour in outdoor bushfires,
focusing on individual cognition, and taking into account both pre-evacuation decision-makingwith contradic-
tory motivations (evacuate or protect house) and evacuation itself.
Future work
6.9 Our model relies on simplifying hypotheses and will need to be extended in the future. In particular, the ini-
tial situation has exactly one person per house, while statements and reports show the importance of family
relationships (several people in the same housemaking a decision together), and of tourists or visitors who (in
addition to their lack of knowledge) have nowhere to gowhen the fire surprises them outside. Also, we need to
model how dierent sources of information (observation of fire, information on the radio, visits from authori-
ties, phone calls from relatives, etc) with dierent levels of trustworthiness are combined to evaluate risk and
make a decision. Emotions should also be added, in line with the interviews that show their key role in many
behaviours.
6.10 Our agent architecture is also very simple, tailored to prove our point about the discrepancy between objective
and subjective values of danger and ability. In future work we plan to design a BDI (belief, desire, intention)
model of behaviour, improving its descriptivity but also its explaining power, since mental attitudes are peo-
ple’s preferred level of abstraction to explain behaviour (Adam & Gaudou 2016). The GAMA platform provides a
plugin for implementing BDI agents Taillandier et al. (2016) and emotions Bourgais et al. (2016) based on a BDI
formalisation Adam et al. (2009).
6.11 Thanks to this high explicative value, this model can serve two complementary purposes. First, we intend to
transform it into a serious game which will be a valuable tool for decision-makers to test response and com-
munication strategies on a simulated population, in order to better handle future bushfires; this requires a very
realistic human behaviour model to lay valid results. Second, this model will raise awareness about the factors
explaining real human behaviour, and therefore encourage modellers to improve their models by considering
these factors; this will probably also require the development of newmethodologies and tools, advancing the
field of agent-basedmodelling as a result.
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